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extraterritorially. Notwithstanding issues of comity, the extraterritorial operation of the anti-fraud 
provisions in United States securities law has been expansively interpreted by US courts, particularly 
in multinational securities class actions, and the US has accordingly been portrayed as a securities 
policeman or, more disparagingly, a legal imperialist. This ended abruptly with the US Supreme 
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to more securities class actions being commenced in Australia.] 
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I   IN T R O D U C T I O N 
This case note will examine the emergence of the global securities market and 
its effect upon enforcement of securities laws via an exploration of the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd 
(‘Morrison’).1 There is an ongoing tension between securities regulation, which 
is based on national regulatory systems, and the increasingly global nature of 
securities transactions. Although relatively underdeveloped, various models have 
been proposed to achieve securities regulation on an international scale, includ-
ing the establishment of an international regulator, global law, and synchronised 
or harmonised national or regional regulation. The issue of enforcement has 
particular salience in this area because political and cultural differences between 
jurisdictions lead to significant divergences in approaches to enforcement, and 
harmonisation is accordingly more complex. The diversity of approaches also 
encourages international actors to ‘shop for law’ and engage in regulatory 
arbitrage. 
To some extent, the difficulties of harmonisation may be sidelined by the 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by certain states, but this strategy is 
limited by the international principles of comity. The use of extraterritoriality has 
 
 1 130 S Ct 2869 (2010). 
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allowed the United States (‘US’) to play a dominant role in both public and 
private transnational enforcement of securities laws. Increasingly, the multina-
tional securities class action has developed in the US to facilitate private 
enforcement. An expansive judicial interpretation of the extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, together with aggressive marketing by US plaintiff lawyers, has led to many 
claims by foreign investors being litigated in US courts. 
This trend has been significantly curtailed by the decision in Morrison, where 
an action by an Australian investor against an Australian company listed on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (‘ASX’) for alleged misconduct in breach of 
Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) r 10b-5 (‘rule 10b-5’)2 and 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘Exchange Act’)3 (collectively 
referred to as the ‘anti-fraud provisions’) was dismissed by the US Supreme 
Court. The Court in that case established a new transactional test to determine 
whether § 10(b) of the Exchange Act had extraterritorial operation, finding that 
the anti-fraud provisions only applied in respect of the purchase or sale of 
securities listed on a US exchange or where the purchase or sale occurred in  
the US. 
Morrison is interesting for several reasons. First, the decision overturned over 
40 years of authority where the circuit courts had adopted a wide interpretation 
of the conduct necessary to invite the extraterritorial operation of § 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act. The decision therefore indicates a reversal of the role of the US as 
an international securities policeman. Perhaps more disparagingly, it signals an 
end to the aggressive approach to extraterritoriality adopted by US courts that 
has been portrayed as legal imperialism by some commentators.4 This dual 
portrayal of the US is manifested in several of the amicus briefs filed on behalf 
of foreign governments in the Morrison proceedings before the Supreme Court. 
This case note will also highlight some of the differences in procedural rules 
which demonstrate the diversity in enforcement regimes of various nations, and 
will speculate on the future role of Australia and its developing class action 
jurisprudence if Morrison has a centrifugal effect upon securities litigation. 
Although it is early days, the subsequent US case law indicates that the 
‘bright-line’ transactional test for jurisdiction promulgated in Morrison will be 
followed strictly by US courts. However, shortly after the Supreme Court 
decision was handed down, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (‘Dodd–Frank Act’)5 which preserves the extrater-
ritorial application of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act for public enforcement actions 
by the SEC and requires the SEC to seek public comment in relation to the future 
of the extraterritorial jurisdiction in private enforcement actions. The situation is 
therefore likely to remain dynamic for the foreseeable future. 
 
 2 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2009). 
 3 15 USC § 78j (2006). 
 4 See below Part IV(A). 
 5 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010). 
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I I   MO R R I S O N  — TH E  FA C T S 
HomeSide Lending Inc (‘HomeSide’) was, at the relevant time, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the National Australia Bank Ltd (‘NAB’). Domiciled in 
Florida, HomeSide’s core business was the servicing of loan contracts. The 
plaintiffs alleged that statements by officers of NAB and HomeSide, both within 
and outside the US and Australia, together with annual reports produced in 
Australia and other public documents, actively trumpeted the value of Home-
Side’s assets. Subsequently, the modelling and assumptions that formed the basis 
of that asset valuation were revealed to be highly inaccurate, and there was also a 
suggestion that HomeSide’s officers had fraudulently manipulated the underlying 
data and grossly inflated HomeSide’s worth. HomeSide’s assets were then 
subject to considerable writedowns which affected the value of NAB’s ordinary 
shares. Those shares were listed only on the ASX.6 
A group of Australian investors (‘the Australian litigants’) who held NAB 
ordinary shares during the class period, together with an individual (‘the US 
litigant’) holding American Depositary Receipts (‘ADRs’)7 purchased on the 
New York Stock Exchange (‘NYSE’),8 sought to represent a class of investors 
and brought suit against NAB, its CEO and several officers of HomeSide for 
breaches of the anti-fraud provisions, which are detailed later in this case note.9 
The Morrison plaintiffs initially commenced proceedings in the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York (‘District Court’). The defendants moved 
to dismiss the claim before the District Court for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure r 12(b)(1) (‘rule 12(b)(1)’) and for 
failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure r 12(b)(6) 
(‘rule 12(b)(6)’). 
Both the District Court10 and Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (‘Second 
Circuit’)11 dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
rule 12(b)(1) in respect of the Australian litigants, and for failure to state a claim 
pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) in respect of the US litigant. 
Due to the dismissal of the related claim by the ADR holder, by the time the 
matter reached the Supreme Court all the members of the class were foreign 
 
 6 Morrison, 130 S Ct 2869, 2875–6 (Scalia J for Roberts CJ, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and 
Alito JJ) (2010). See also Goodkind Labaton Rudoff & Sucharow LLP, ‘Consolidated Class 
Action Complaint’, Complaint in Re National Australia Bank Securities Litigation, SD NY, 
No 03 Civ 6537 (BSJ), 30 January 2004, [32]–[110] <http://www.labaton.com/en/cases> for a 
more thorough overview of the allegations of fact. 
 7 See US Securities and Exchange Commission, American Depository Receipts (31 January 2007) 
<http://www.sec.gov/answers/adrs.htm>:  
Each ADR represents one or more shares of foreign stock or a fraction of a share. [Owners of 
ADRs] have the right to obtain the foreign stock it represents, but US investors usually find it 
more convenient to own the ADR. The price of an ADR corresponds to the price of the foreign 
stock in its home market, adjusted to the ratio of the ADRs to foreign company shares. 
 8 Re National Australia Bank Securities Litigation (SD NY, No 03 Civ 6537 (BSJ), 25 October 
2006) slip op 4 (Jones J). 
 9 See below Part V. 
 10 Re National Australia Bank Securities Litigation (SD NY, No 03 Civ 6537 (BSJ), 25 October 
2006). 
 11 Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 547 F 3d 167 (2nd Cir, 2008). 
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litigants. In fact, Morrison was referred to as a ‘foreign-cubed’ or ‘f-cubed’12 
action because it involved foreign plaintiffs (the Australian litigants) suing a 
foreign issuer (NAB) and concerned securities trading on a foreign exchange 
(ordinary shares trading on the ASX).13  
The Morrison litigation generated considerable controversy as it progressed 
through the US court hierarchy. This was manifested in the amicus briefs filed in 
the Supreme Court hearing by organisations such as investors, issuers, markets, 
think tanks and lobby groups. This case note will focus, however, upon the 
amicus briefs filed by governments, in particular the governments of Australia, 
France and the United Kingdom (‘UK’). 
I I I   TH E  CO N T E X T O F  MO R R I S O N 
Morrison involved a foreign transaction litigated under US domestic law. The 
question for the Supreme Court was whether the anti-fraud provisions had 
extraterritorial reach so as to regulate transactions conducted in Australia. 
However, two questions to ask at the threshold are: first, why were these issues 
being dealt with by US domestic law and secondly, what are the prospects for an 
international enforcement regime, either by way of global law, a world regulator 
or a harmonised/synchronised securities law? These questions form an important 
backdrop to the Morrison litigation and will be ventilated now. 
A  The Rise of Global Securities Transactions 
It is a platitude to say that securities transactions are increasingly conducted in 
a global context. The purchase of financial products frequently takes place on 
foreign exchanges or over-the-counter (‘OTC’) where the purchaser, seller and 
intermediaries may be scattered in different places across the world. In fact, due 
to the development of technology, physical presence is often either random or 
unimportant to the transaction.14 Investors increasingly operate over several time 
zones, ‘eclips[ing] … national transactions as [they] seek to take advantage of 
emerging markets and to further diversify their holdings.’15  
Several factors have converged to give investors easy access to foreign ex-
changes and OTC transactions. These factors include the abolition of exchange 
controls, the liberalisation of foreign investment restrictions and the consolida-
 
 12 Ibid 172 (Parker J for Newman, Calabresi and Parker JJ). 
 13 A foreign corporation is defined by the origin of its constitution (charter): see American Law 
Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) § 213.  
A foreign issuer means ‘any issuer which is … a corporation or other organization incorporated 
or organized under the laws of any foreign country’: 17 CFR § 230.405. See also Hannah L 
Buxbaum, ‘Multinational Class Actions under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional 
Conflict’ (2007) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 14, 17, citing Stuart M Grant and 
Diane Zilka, ‘The Role of Foreign Investors in Federal Securities Class Actions’ in Corporate 
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series (No 1442, Practising Law Institute, 2004) 91, 96. 
 14 Donald C Langevoort, ‘Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud Protection in  
an Internationalized Securities Marketplace’ (1992) 55(4) Law and Contemporary Problems  
241, 247. 
 15 Kellye Y Testy, ‘Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global Marketplace’ (1994) 
45 Alabama Law Review 927, 931. 
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tion of financial markets.16 Increasingly, financial markets are merging to create 
new regional and cross-sectoral financial markets. In 2007, the NYSE Group Inc 
and Euronext NV commenced trading as NYSE Euronext, which now describes 
itself as the ‘world’s leading and most liquid equities exchange group’.17 
Similarly, the ASX is currently seeking a new merger partner after the Australian 
Treasurer rejected its merger proposal with Singapore Exchange Ltd.18 This was 
the first consolidation proposal between two market operators in the Asia-Pacific 
region.19 Moreover, there is considerable competition between the established 
and emerging financial centres and securities markets, such as those in Asia.20 
The development of technology has allowed the spread of information and a 
corresponding interpenetration of securities markets.21 Investors may now ‘seek 
out foreign investments that are not even marketed domestically … [and] 
participate in foreign-based investment entities.’22  
B  The Legal Framework and the Law Market 
Although nationality is often irrelevant in securities transactions, securities 
lawmaking is still essentially focused on the nation-state. The challenge for 
lawmakers in established markets is determining how to adapt and modernise 
national regulatory systems, which were conceived when markets were primarily 
local, to respond to investors and issuers that are already operating on a global 
level.23 In the emerging markets of Asia, such as China and India, lawmakers are 
 
 16 Treasury, Australian Government and Australian Securities and Investment Commission, ‘Cross 
Border Recognition: Facilitating Access to Overseas Markets and Financial Services’ (Consulta-
tion Paper No 98, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, 16 June 2008) 9 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/IR+08-15+Joint+treasury+and+ASIC+consultation+ 
on+cross+border+recognition+of+financial+regulation>. 
 17 NYSE Euronext, About Us (26 July 2011) <http://www.nyse.com/about/1088808971270.html>. 
See generally Sara M Saylor, ‘Are Securities Regulators Prepared for a Truly Transnational 
Exchange?’ (2008) 33 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 685. 
 18 ASX, ‘Treasurer Rejects ASX–SGX Merger Proposal’ (Market Announcement, 8 April 2011) 
<http://www.asxgroup.com.au/asx-market-announcements.htm>; Mitchell Bingemann, ‘Analysts 
Still Hopeful of Another ASX Tie-Up’, Finance, The Australian (Sydney), 11 April 2011, 23. 
 19 Alicia Barry, ‘Watchdog Clears ASX’s Singapore Merger’, ABC News (online), 15 December 
2010 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/12/15/3093598.htm>. 
 20 A study by the World Federation of Exchanges of the market capitalisation of exchanges by time 
zone between 2000 and 2009 shows that the Asia-Pacific sector has grown from 16 per cent to 
31 per cent. In contrast, the Americas time zone has declined from 53 per cent to 41 per cent and 
the EAME (Europe–Africa–Middle East) time zone has remained relatively stable, moving from 
31 per cent to 28 per cent: World Federation of Exchanges, 10 Years in Review (2000–2009) 1 
<http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics>. The 2010 figures regarding investment flows also 
demonstrate this trend. The five largest exchanges by number of new companies listed through 
an IPO during the period January to June 2010 show the following order: Shenzhen Stock Ex-
change (164), TSX Group (now TMX Group) (137), Bombay Stock Exchange (57), Warsaw 
Stock Exchange (40) and NYSE Euronext (38): World Federation of Exchanges, Market High-
lights for First Half-Year 2010 (July 2010) 8 <http://www.world-exchanges.org/files/file/ 
stats%20and%20charts/July%202010%20WFE%20Market%20Highlights.pdf>. However, in terms 
of domestic equity market capitalisation, the NYSE Euronext market (with US$11 794 billion) 
far exceeds its next competitor, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (with US$3277 billion). 
 21 Buxbaum, above n 13, 41. 
 22 Langevoort, ‘Schoenbaum Revisited’, above n 14, 244. 
 23 Margaret E Tahyar et al, Final Report of the Securities Law Subcommittee of the Task Force on 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the International Bar Association (2008) 277–8. 
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developing new internal securities markets at a time when other securities 
markets are already international in scope.24 
However, a consequence of the status quo is that transnational actors, both 
issuers and investors, can shop for law, and nation states often ‘take this “law 
market” into account when they create new laws.’25 One concern is that issuers 
will engage in regulatory arbitrage where they engage in fraud in one country but 
remain unaccountable to investors in other countries with stronger enforcement 
regimes.26 This would lead to a race to the bottom.27 
The evidence provided by research on cross-listing indicates that shopping for 
law in the securities context does not necessarily lead to such a race to the 
bottom.28 Since the 1980s, firms have chosen to trade their shares in markets 
other than their home countries, even though this obliges them to comply with 
two or more sets of regulations. The reason for cross-listing is said to be based 
upon the so-called bonding hypothesis, whereby firms subject themselves to a 
‘higher level of regulation in the cross-listing countr[ies] [in order to] “bond” 
their trustworthiness, thereby enabling them to raise money at a lower price all 
over the world.’29 Much of the research on cross-listing is based in the US 
market and demonstrates two empirical trends. First, ‘firms with US crosslistings 
exhibit a valuation premium relative to similar firms without crosslistings’;30 and 
secondly, ‘foreign firms that crosslist on US exchanges incur a reduction in the 
cost of capital’.31 Coffee explains that the bonding effect occurs because the 
listing firm, inter alia,  
becomes subject to the enforcement powers of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission … [and] investors acquire the ability to exercise effective and low-
cost legal remedies, such as class actions and derivative actions, that are … not 
available in the firm’s home jurisdiction.32  
Therefore ‘the level of enforcement intensity … distinguishes jurisdictions in a 
manner that can explain national differences in the cost of capital’.33 
The bonding hypothesis assumes that both issuers and investors shop for law, 
and that investors, in particular, shop for effective enforcement.34 The question 
 
 24 Ibid 279. 
 25 Erin A O’Hara and Larry E Ribstein, The Law Market (Oxford University Press, 2009) 3. 
 26 See Buxbaum, above n 13, 57. 
 27 Merritt B Fox, ‘The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: US Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing 
Market for Securities’ (1998) 97 Michigan Law Review 696, 784–5. 
 28 Roberta Romano, ‘Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation’ (1998) 
107 Yale Law Journal 2359, 2426–7. 
 29 O’Hara and Ribstein, above n 25, 30. See also John C Coffee Jr, ‘The Future as History: The 
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications’ (1999) 93 
Northwestern University Law Review 641, 691–2. 
 30 Natalya Shnitser, ‘A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC and Private Enforce-
ment against Foreign Issuers’ (2010) 119 Yale Law Journal 1638, 1647. 
 31 Ibid 1648. 
 32 John C Coffee Jr, ‘Racing towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market 
Competition on International Corporate Governance’ (2002) 102 Columbia Law Review 1757, 
1780. See also Coffee, ‘The Future as History’, above n 29, 691–2. 
 33 John C Coffee Jr, ‘Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement’ (2007) 156 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 229, 233. See also Shnitser, above n 30, 1647–9. 
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therefore arises as to whether policymakers and legislators should take this into 
account when framing domestic laws. Recently, concern has been expressed 
about capital flight from the US markets in general and the decline in cross-
listings in particular. This issue was raised in the amicus briefs filed by issuers 
and markets in Morrison which argued that foreign companies are exiting the US 
markets due to the uncertainties and costs created by securities class actions.35 
However, other authors argue that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (‘Sarbanes–
Oxley’)36 is the cause.37 Such a conclusion is understandable when the data 
indicates, for example, that since 2002 many US companies have chosen to 
bypass listing on US markets altogether, preferring to list in the UK instead.38 In 
the period 2002 to 2006 the UK increased its global market share of IPOs from 
five to 25 per cent.39 However, Pan demonstrates that the movement of 
companies away from the US markets began in the early 1990s — long before 
Sarbanes–Oxley — as foreign companies took advantage of new ways to raise 
money from deep pools of capital without having to go to the US.40 Therefore 
the evidence as to the causes of these phenomena is unclear. Perhaps the best 
approach is summed up by O’Hara and Ribstein: ‘the actual effect of regulation 
is seldom clear.’41 
C  The Prospects for Global Regulation 
Assuming that securities law based on geographic boundaries is becoming 
increasingly infeasible and that the creation of a global system of securities 
regulation is desirable, further questions arise as to how such a system would be 
structured. Based on the observation that ‘[c]apital has never allowed its aspira-
 
 34 Coffee, ‘Racing towards the Top?’, above n 32, 1767. 
 35 Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association et al, ‘Brief of Amici Curiae the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association et al in Support of Respondents’, Submission in 
Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, No 08-1191, 26 February 2010, 5, 12, citing Charles 
Roxburgh et al, ‘Global Capital Markets: Entering a New Era’ (Research Report, McKinsey 
Global Institute, September 2009) 8–9, 13–15 <http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications>. 
 36 Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745. 
 37 Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report (2006) 47–8 
<http://www.capmktsreg.org/research.html>. For a discussion, see O’Hara and Ribstein, above 
n 25, 30; Donald C Langevoort, ‘US Securities Regulation and Global Competition’ (2008) 3 
Virginia Law and Business Review 191, 195–6; Coffee, ‘Law and the Market’, above n 33, 290. 
Sarbanes–Oxley was passed in the wake of the collapse of Enron in 2001 and of WorldCom in 
2002; the Act tightened standards for, inter alia, corporate reporting and auditing: see Donald C 
Langevoort, ‘The Social Construction of Sarbanes–Oxley’ (2007) 105 Michigan Law Review 
1817, 1821; Larry E Ribstein, ‘Market vs Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique 
of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002’ (2002) 28 Journal of Corporation Law 1, 11–18. 
 38 See, eg, Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, above n 37, 3. 
 39 Ibid. 
 40 Eric J Pan, ‘Why the World No Longer Puts Its Stock in Us’ (Working Paper No 176, Jacob 
Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, Benjamin N Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva Uni-
versity, 2006) 2 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951705>. See also Coffee, 
‘Law and the Market’, above n 33, 241–2. 
 41 O’Hara and Ribstein, above n 25, 229 n 26. 
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tions to be determined by national boundaries’,42 Teubner has speculated about 
the creation of global law, that is, law without a state. Under this vision, civil 
society itself will globalise its legal orders.43 In the securities context, economic 
actors have strong incentives to create a transnational law of economic transac-
tions (lex mercatoria) which would potentially create a legal ordering independ-
ent of the nation state.44 Although the rise and spread of commercial arbitration 
across international and domestic contexts demonstrates the persuasiveness of 
these arguments, Teubner argues that lex mercatoria will never develop into an 
authentic legal order because it does not possess an exclusive territory with 
coercive powers. As Teubner states, ‘[c]ommercial customs by themselves are 
incapable of creating law; they can only be transformed into law by a formal act 
of the sovereign state.’45 Clearly, private ordering may produce valid enforceable 
agreements with the authorisation of and control by the state, but enforcement 
generally occurs through the institutions of the state.46 This is demonstrated by 
the fairly extensive debates in Australia and internationally about the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements.47 
If it is unrealistic to imagine global law without a state, another option is a 
world securities regulatory body,48 that is, a supernational regulator modelled on 
national agencies such as the SEC or the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (‘ASIC’). Choi argues that whilst in theory a ‘benevolent and well-
informed world securities regulator might provide the best solution to problems 
that might arise within a global securities market’49 and would ensure that 
investors have access to mandatory securities regulation, such a proposal is not 
 
 42 Gunther Teubner, ‘“Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in Gunther 
Teubner (ed), Global Law without a State (Dartmouth Publishing, 1997) 3, 5–6, referring 
generally to the work of Karl Mannheim. 
 43 Ibid 3. 
 44 See Hans-Joachim Mertens, ‘Lex Mercatoria: A Self-Applying System beyond National Law?’ in 
Gunther Teubner (ed), Global Law without a State (Dartmouth Publishing, 1997) 31. 
 45 Teubner, above n 42, 10. 
 46 See ibid 16–17. 
 47 Chief Justice P A Keane, ‘Judicial Support for Arbitration in Australia’ (Paper presented at the 
Financial Review International Dispute Resolution Conference, Sydney, 15 October 2010); 
Richard Garnett, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in Australia: Legal Framework and 
Problems’ (2008) 19 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 249; Vicki Donnenberg, ‘Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards under the Commercial Arbitration Acts’ (2008) 30 Australian Bar 
Review 177; Dale Clapperton and Stephen Corones, ‘Unfair Terms in “Clickwrap” and Other 
Electronic Contracts’ (2007) 35 Australian Business Law Review 152, 173–4; Jeffrey W Stempel, 
‘Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass Arbitration’ (2008) 76 University of Cincinnati Law 
Review 383; Steven J Burton, ‘The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, 
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate’ [2006] Journal of Dispute Resolution 
469; Judith Resnik, ‘Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puzzles 
of Declining Trial Rates in Courts’ (2004) 1 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 783, 814–17; 
Stephen J Ware, ‘Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 
Agreements’ [2001] Journal of Dispute Resolution 89. 
 48 Uri Geiger, ‘Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market — A Proposal’ 
(1998) 66 Fordham Law Review 1785, 1800–5, cited in Stephen J Choi, ‘Assessing Regulatory 
Responses to Securities Market Globalization’ (2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 613, 643. 
 49 Choi, above n 48, 643. 
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feasible due to political obstacles and the amplification of regulatory errors 
which would occur with a single global regulator.50  
In the absence of an international superstructure by way of global law or a 
world regulator, the next option is coordination or synchronisation between 
national regulators. A model for such cooperation might be the ‘networks’ 
concept developed by Slaughter,51 which entails ‘loose, cooperative arrange-
ments between and among like agencies seeking to respond to global issues.’52 
In the securities context, the networks are transgovernmental53 or based on 
clubs.54 Most commentators agree that it is unrealistic to seek a comprehensive 
or common set of international regulations; rather, synchronisation of existing 
national and regional regulation is desirable.55  
Indeed, the move towards synchronisation of national laws rather than the 
creation of a global regulator is reflected in the work of the Financial Stability 
Board (‘FSB’), which was created following the G-20’s London Summit in 
March 2009.56 The FSB emerged as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum 
in order to broaden membership to include developing economies.57 Amongst the 
FSB’s mandates is the coordination ‘at the international level [of] the work of 
national financial authorities … [to] address vulnerabilities affecting financial 
systems in the interest of global financial stability.’58 
In relation to enforcement, regulators have entered into several bilateral and 
multilateral agreements to facilitate cross-border enforcement and the exchange 
of information.59 This is often conducted under the auspices of the International 
 
 50 Ibid. 
 51 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004) ch 1. 
 52 Chris Brummer, ‘Post-American Securities Regulation’ (2010) 98 California Law Review 327, 
329–30. 
 53 This term was coined by Raustiala to describe networks involving ‘specialized domestic officials 
directly interacting with each other, often with minimal supervision by foreign ministries’: Kal 
Raustiala, ‘The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the 
Future of International Law’ (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 4–5 (emphasis 
altered). 
 54 See generally Brummer, above n 52. 
 55 See, eg, Tahyar et al, above n 23, 279; Kathleen L Casey, ‘The Role of International Regulatory 
Cooperation and Coordination in Promoting Efficient Capital Markets’ (Speech delivered at the 
Istituto Bruno Leoni, Milan, 12 June 2010) <http://www.sec.gov/news/speech.shtml>. 
 56 G-20, ‘Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System’ (Communiqué, 2 April 2009) 
<http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx>. 
 57 See generally Enrique R Carrasco, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability 
Forum: The Awakening and Transformation of an International Body’ (2010) 19 Transnational 
Law and Contemporary Problems 203. 
 58 FSB, Charter (September 2009) art 1 <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org>. 
 59 Casey, above n 55. See, eg, International Organization of Securities Commissions, Multilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of 
Information (May 2002), of which US, UK, French and Australian regulatory authorities are 
signatories: International Organization of Securities Commissions, List of Signatories to the 
IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation 
and the Exchange of Information (2011) <https://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section= 
mou_siglist>. The US also has specific bilateral agreements in place with Australia, the UK and 
France (amongst others) concerning enforcement and regulatory cooperation: see, eg, SEC and 
ASIC, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation in the Ad-
ministration and Enforcement of Securities Laws (October 1993); SEC and College of Euronext 
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Organization of Security Commissions (‘IOSCO’). One of IOSCO’s objectives is 
to reduce systemic risk,60 and recent commentary has pointed to market interde-
pendency and exposure to systemic risk — two characteristics brought into sharp 
relief by the global financial crisis — as factors that make a uniform approach to 
market regulation and enforcement desirable.61 
However, it is unwise to overstate ‘the transformative potential of regulatory 
interconnectivity.’62 In the enforcement context, important practical and cultural 
differences not only undermine the harmonisation objective but may be a virtue 
if, as is argued by some commentators, regulatory competition amongst jurisdic-
tions is desirable. Romano argues that a market for securities regimes is superior 
to a single regulator or a regulatory cartel of internationally harmonised regimes. 
She posits that issuers should be provided with a choice of regulatory regimes, 
particularly for disclosure standards.63 Choi adds that a potential race to the 
bottom is avoided because investors will purchase securities from issuers that 
adopt valued investor protections, which in turn reduces the cost of capital for 
issuers.64 
IV  TH E  EX T E N S I O N  O F  NAT I ON AL JU R I S D I C T I O N  B Y 
EX T R AT E R R I TO R I A L I T Y 
Whilst we are waiting for the global securities enforcement regime to develop, 
what strategies may be adopted in the meantime? The most common approach, 
and perhaps the most contentious, is the use of extraterritoriality by nation states 
to enforce their domestic securities laws in foreign contexts. This allows coun-
tries to extend the reach of their securities laws beyond territorial borders. This 
strategy was at the heart of the controversy in the Morrison case. As is discussed 
below in Part V(C), prior to Morrison, US case law had developed to allow US 
securities laws to be applied to transactions which occurred outside the US but 
which had a significant effect within the US. 
There are several instrumental concerns about the use of extraterritoriality to 
achieve global securities regulation. For example, Choi doubts whether extrater-
ritoriality achieves socially optimal regulation and argues that it applies haphaz-
ardly, creating uncertainty as to the amount of contact necessary to generate 
jurisdiction.65 This aspect of the case law that preceded Morrison is discussed 
below in Part V(E). There are also questions as to whether the development of 
extraterritoriality principles through case law encourages plaintiffs to specula-
 
Regulators, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the 
Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight (January 2007). 
 60 IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (May 2003) i <http://www.iosco.org/ 
library/index.cfm?section=pubdocs>. 
 61 Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’ (2008) 97 Georgetown Law Journal 193, 245–6. See also 
Langevoort, ‘US Securities Regulation and Global Competition’, above n 37, 205. 
 62 Brummer, above n 52, 330. 
 63 Roberta Romano, ‘The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation’ (2001) 2 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 387, 389–90. 
 64 Choi, above n 48, 645. 
 65 Ibid 642. 
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tively choose forums after a dispute has arisen, rather than promoting a more 
predictable ex ante arrangement between the parties.66 In terms of institutional 
design, Testy argues that courts are ill-equipped to make these judgments on a 
case-by-case basis since the extraterritorial application of US securities law 
involves ‘difficult market efficiency concerns and political sensitivities’.67 
A  Imperialism or Policing? 
Clearly political sensitivities are fundamentally important in any debate about 
extraterritoriality. The grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction may lead to confronta-
tion with a foreign government68 and raises important questions about the 
characterisation of the nation that assumes jurisdiction. The authors of a note on 
this topic published in the Harvard Law Review in 1985 referred to two theories 
of jurisdiction: the power theory, which is based on the capacity of a legal system 
to coerce, and the fairness theory, where jurisdiction is ultimately based on the 
consent of the parties.69 The note argued that the power theory will generate ‘an 
ever-growing laundry list of bases for extraterritoriality’, whereas the fairness 
theory will produce a uniform rule.70 At that time, the authors argued that the US 
courts had moved to the fairness test domestically but not internationally.71 
Writing in the 1990s, Testy observed that the overreach of US securities law had 
been criticised domestically and abroad, including being denounced as a form of 
legal and economic imperialism.72 She considered that the application of US 
securities laws to transactions having only a tenuous relationship to the US ‘risks 
offending other nations by perpetuating an already problematic image of Ameri-
can pomposity.’73 
Whilst the assumption of extraterritorial jurisdiction might brand the US as a 
legal and economic imperialist, there is an alternative vision — that of the US as 
a securities policeman.74 In this guise, the US uses extraterritoriality to protect its 
own citizens and to defeat international securities fraud. In a nod to popular 
culture which, though not contemporary, has some resonance, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit illustrated this role in Securities and Exchange 
 
 66 O’Hara and Ribstein argue that the unilateral choice of forum by plaintiffs after a dispute has 
arisen is ‘more likely to transfer wealth between the parties than to increase … society’s wealth’: 
O’Hara and Ribstein, above n 25, 26. 
 67 Testy, above n 15, 929. 
 68 Bruce Alan Rosenfield, ‘Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws 
Approach’ (1976) 28 Stanford Law Review 1005, 1026. 
 69 Note, ‘Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ 
(1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 1310, 1319. 
 70 Ibid. 
 71 Ibid. 
 72 Testy, above n 15, 932–3. 
 73 Ibid 957. 
 74 John C Coffee Jr, ‘Securities Policeman to the World? The Cost of Global Class Actions’, New 
York Law Journal (New York), 18 September 2008, 5. 
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Commission v Kasser (‘Kasser’) as the US protecting citizens from the fraudsters 
of the Barbary Coast.75 
It must be conceded that, whilst the characterisation of the US as a legal and 
economic imperialist may raise more international ire than the benign portrayal 
of it patrolling the beat as a securities policeman, the latter depiction may be 
equally as irritating to some foreign governments, as demonstrated by the amicus 
briefs filed in Morrison. This is discussed below in Part IV(E). 
B  Comity 
Extending the reach of a jurisdiction’s laws by adopting extraterritoriality is 
limited by the principle of comity. ‘Comity’ refers to a  
body of rules developed in international law by which the courts of a state 
demonstrate respect for the rules, customs, and laws of another state. Non-
observance of comity does not give rise to strict legal consequences, however, 
the state affected by the non-observance may reciprocate by retracting its own 
courteous practices.76  
Courts commonly refer to comity in a wide range of contexts,77 but the authors 
of the Harvard Law Review note (referred to above) considered that it was rarely 
treated by US courts as a crucial enquiry and that the ‘nod to foreign interests’ 
was ‘rarely more than perfunctory’.78 However, in an article that was cited by the 
majority opinion in the US Supreme Court in Morrison,79 Langevoort argued for 
restraint in applying the principle of extraterritoriality because, inter alia, foreign 
plaintiff litigation is becoming a drain on US judicial resources and that such 
forbearance will facilitate the establishment of a cooperative scheme of interna-
 
 75 548 F 2d 109, 116 (Adams J for Adams, Weis and Fogel JJ) (3rd Cir, 1977). The term ‘Barbary 
Coast’ refers to the northern coast of Africa where Barbary pirates (based on the Berber people 
of West Africa) and slave traders were said to operate. This meaning is consistent with the con-
cern expressed by the Kasser Court regarding ‘international securities “pirates”’. However, the 
authors prefer an alternative meaning referring to a district in San Francisco which became a 
haven for former Australian convicts during the 1850s. The convicts, known as the ‘Sydney 
Ducks’, had come looking for gold after news of the gold rush had reached Australia before the 
East Coast of the US. Consider this account:  
By the early autumn of 1849 the arrivals from Australia had become so numerous, and so thor-
oughly dominated the underworld, that the district in which they congregated began to be 
known as Sydney-Town … It was this area that later became notorious throughout the world as 
the Barbary Coast … Unquestionably, these foreign felons gave San Francisco’s underworld 
its initial flavour; they were pioneers in the viciousness and depravity for which the Barbary 
Coast became famous … 
  Andrew Parkin, ‘Australians and New Zealanders’ in Stephan Thernstrom, Ann Orlov and Oscar 
Handlin (eds), Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups (Belknap Press, 1980) 163, 
163, quoting Herbert Asbury, The Barbary Coast: An Informal History of the San Francisco 
Underworld (Jarrolds Publishers, 1934) 49–50. 
 76 LexisNexis, Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (at 9 May 2011) ‘Comity’. 
 77 Lawrence Collins, ‘Comity in Modern Private International Law’ in James Fawcett (ed), Reform 
and Development of Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 2002) 89, cited in 
Mary Keyes, Jurisdiction in International Litigation (Federation Press, 2005) 191. 
 78 Note, above n 69, 1324–5. 
 79 Morrison, 130 S Ct 2869, 2880 (Scalia J for Roberts CJ, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito JJ) 
(2010). 
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tional securities regulation.80 Langevoort considered that an aggressive US 
posture signals to other countries that they can free-ride on US enforcement 
efforts or are deemed to be inferior regulators.81 
C  Passionate Disagreement about Enforcement Practices and Procedural Rules  
The primary issue in Morrison concerned the appropriate ambit of enforce-
ment of domestic securities laws. Enforcement creates particular difficulties for 
international cooperation because of the significant cultural, political and 
economic differences that are reflected in the domestic rules about enforcement 
and regulatory intensity.82 It is axiomatic that countries create very different 
regulatory structures, provide different levels of resources to public enforcement 
activity and enforce securities laws with varying degrees of intensity.83 A cross-
jurisdictional survey conducted by the International Bar Association in 2004 
found that enforcement remained the key area where harmonisation was lack-
ing.84 The divergences are perhaps most profound in the choices that jurisdic-
tions make about the relationship between public and private enforcement, and 
policy choices about collective proceedings. As a consequence, this area gives 
rise to passionate disagreement about enforcement practices and the content of 
procedural rules. 
D  The Multinational Class Action 
In the midst of this passionate disagreement, the multinational securities class 
action has emerged. Buxbaum defines this as an action brought against a foreign 
issuer on behalf of a plaintiff class that includes investors who purchased on a 
foreign securities exchange.85 These cases, including Morrison, are referred to as 
‘foreign-cubed’ or ‘f-cubed’ because they have three foreign elements: the 
investor, the issuer and the securities exchange.86 Apart from what they reveal 
about extraterritoriality, these cases show the effect of the multinational class 
action upon other markets, in particular the market for legal services. It is 
noteworthy that US plaintiff firms are actively recruiting international investors 
for US securities class actions. In particular, US firms have opened offices in 
Europe in order to seek out European funds.87 Others have formed relationships 
with foreign firms who act as local partners in developing business opportuni-
ties.88 This introduces an additional element of entrepreneurial lawyering which 
 
 80 Langevoort, ‘Schoenbaum Revisited’, above n 14, 249–50. 
 81 Ibid 250. 
 82 Tahyar et al, above n 23, 290. 
 83 Ibid 288. 
 84 Margaret E Tahyar and Jake S Tyshow, ‘Results of IBA Committee Q Survey on Transparency 
and Enforcement’ (Draft Paper, 2004), cited in ibid 288 n 34. 
 85 Buxbaum, above n 13, 17. 
 86 See above n 13. 
 87 Buxbaum, above n 13, 62. 
 88 Ibid. 
     
294 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 35 
 
     
is endemic to US securities class actions but raises opprobrium in other jurisdic-
tions.89 
It was the remedial and procedural aspects of the US regulations that caused 
the greatest consternation to the participants in Morrison, particularly the 
governments who participated as amici. The literature and the amicus briefs 
highlighted aspects of the American system which diverged significantly from 
those of the onlookers. For example, civil juries, punitive and treble damages, 
opt out procedures and the ‘fraud on the market’ theory90 are well-known 
features of the US system which have been transplanted to a variable extent, 
although generally eschewed, by other jurisdictions. It is a commonly held view 
that these features confer significant advantages upon the plaintiff in US litiga-
tion.91 Whether it is empirically correct or not, the influence of the belief may be 
sufficient to garner litigation into US courts.92 As Lord Denning MR pithily 
observed, ‘[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United 
States.’93 
E  Extraterritoriality and the Amicus Briefs in Morrison 
The amicus briefs filed in the US Supreme Court are fascinating reading 
because they reveal the range of interests and strongly held views of stakeholders 
such as investors,94 markets and issuers,95 and foreign governments, in particular 
those of Australia,96 France97 and the UK.98 Although, as discussed below, the 
amicus briefs filed by foreign governments seem to have had little influence on 
the Court’s decision,99 they are worth examining to contemplate the broad policy 
framework within which these views were ventilated. 
In its brief, Australia seemed to be demonstrating its credentials as an effective 
securities regulator to the US Supreme Court. For example, the brief argued that 
Australia provides appropriate civil remedies for plaintiffs who have suffered 
 
 89 Peta Spender, ‘The Class Action as Sheriff: Private Law Enforcement and Remedial Roulette’ in 
Jeff Berryman and Rick Bigwood (eds), The Law of Remedies: New Directions in the Common 
Law (Irwin Law, 2010) 695, 699–701. 
 90 See below Part VIII(B). 
 91 See, eg, Buxbaum, above n 13, 61. 
 92 Ibid 60–1. 
 93 Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Bloch [1983] 1 WLR 730, 733. 
 94 Alecta Pensionsförsäkring, Ömsesidigt et al, ‘Brief for Amici Curiae Alecta Pensionsförsäkring, 
Ömsesidigt et al in Support of Petitioners’, Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank 
Ltd, No 08-1191, 26 January 2010. 
 95 Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association et al, ‘Brief of Amici Curiae the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association et al in Support of Respondents’, Submission in 
Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, No 08-1191, 26 February 2010. 
 96 Australia, ‘Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Defendants–Appellees’, Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 
No 08-1191, 26 February 2010. 
 97 France, ‘Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents’, 
Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, No 08-1191, 26 February 2010. 
 98 United Kingdom, ‘Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents’, Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 
No 08-1191, 25 February 2010. 
 99 See below Part VI(B)(5). 
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loss from a violation of securities law by showing that that there is a clear 
statutory basis for private actions for such violations;100 that class actions are 
available in Australia and have been brought by shareholders;101 and that 
external litigation funding is legally permissible in Australia.102 The Australian 
brief pointed out that a class action could have been brought in Australia in 
relation to the conduct alleged in this case103 but gave no explanation as to why 
there was no public enforcement action in Australia in relation to the NAB 
writedowns. The brief noted that ASIC did not take action vis-a-vis NAB for the 
writedowns,104 with the then ASIC Chairman David Knott actually praising NAB 
for prompt market disclosure of the writedowns, describing the Board’s actions 
as setting ‘a new high-water benchmark for disclosure practice’.105 In contrast, 
ASIC took successful civil penalty actions shortly thereafter against other 
unrelated entities for breaches of the continuous disclosure obligations.106  
After asserting the effectiveness of Australia’s substantive securities laws and 
its enforcement regime, the brief changed tack by emphasising issues of comity. 
The brief noted that there are significant procedural differences between civil 
actions in the US and in Australia but that these different approaches reflect 
public policy choices made by sovereign states and that ‘[a]dopting appropriate 
legal processes is a basic … function on which reasonable sovereigns can 
differ.’107 
The comity arguments in the briefs filed by France and the UK were perhaps 
more strident, reflecting the greater degree to which their domestic enforcement 
regimes differ from those of the US. France argued that comity precludes the 
application of US securities law in f-cubed actions because ‘the US interest [in 
such cases] is attenuated and the foreign interest is paramount.’108 The French 
brief also asserted that nations proscribe securities fraud using incompatible 
regulatory schemes; for example, ‘while the US permits private plaintiffs to 
enforce the anti-fraud provisions in class actions, France and many other nations 
 
100 Australia, ‘Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Defendants–Appellees’, Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 
No 08-1191, 26 February 2010, 15–16. 
101 Ibid 17–21. 
102 Ibid 19, citing Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386. 
103 Australia, ‘Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Defendants–Appellees’, Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 
No 08-1191, 26 February 2010, 21–2. 
104 Ibid 15. 
105 John Breusch and Morgan Mellish, ‘ASIC Praises NAB for Quick Disclosure’, The Australian 
Financial Review (Sydney), 5 September 2001, 40, cited in ibid. 
106 Australia, ‘Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Defendants–Appellees’, Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 
No 08-1191, 26 February 2010, 15, citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v 
Southcorp Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 406 and Re Chemeq Ltd; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission v Chemeq Ltd (2006) 234 ALR 511. 
107 Australia, ‘Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Defendants–Appellees’, Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 
No 08-1191, 26 February 2010, 22–3. 
108 France, ‘Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents’, 
Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, No 08-1191, 26 February 2010, 3. 
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have made a considered policy choice to rely instead on public actions.’109 To 
emphasise the point, France argued that aspects of the US approach conflicted 
with specific foreign legal rules and, in particular, ‘the opt-out aspect of US class 
actions runs afoul of fundamental French public policy and due process princi-
ples.’110  
The UK brief explained that the UK has made a conscious policy choice not to 
introduce a general opt out class action,111 but that its Group Litigation Order 
procedure — an opt in procedure — is an element of a sophisticated legal system 
available for the litigation of securities claims.112  
In relation to questions of comity, the UK brief reminded the Supreme Court of 
its earlier words in Microsoft Corporation v AT & T Corp113 that ‘United States 
law governs domestically but does not rule the world’.114 The UK brief contin-
ued: 
Nations have a strong interest in regulating their own capital markets, develop-
ing disclosure rules to govern their own issuers, deciding how and when class 
action shareholder litigation should occur and determining the penalties for vio-
lations of such laws. Such decisions vary among countries[.] … US judicial in-
terference in those decisions risks damaging the mutual respect that comity is 
meant to protect and could be perceived as an attempt to impose American eco-
nomic, social and judicial values.115 
V  TH E  LE G A L BA C K G R O U N D  TO  MO R R I S O N  
It is in this context that the Morrison litigation wended its way through the 
District and Second Circuit Courts, culminating in the Supreme Court’s decision 
on 24 June 2010. This part of the case note will examine in more detail the issues 
of US domestic law that informed the Supreme Court decision. 
 
109 Ibid 3–4. 
110 Ibid 4. 
111 However, there has been considerable controversy and ongoing policy discussions about this 
issue in the UK. For an insight into this debate, see John Sorabji, Michael Napier and Robert 
Musgrove (eds), ‘“Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions” — Developing a 
More Efficient and Effective Procedure for Collective Actions’ (Final Report, Civil Justice 
Council, November 2008) <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/advisory-bodies/cjc/ 
publications/CJC+papers>. 
112 United Kingdom, ‘Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents’, Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 
No 08-1191, 25 February 2010, 10. 
113 550 US 437 (2007). 
114 Ibid 454 (Ginsburg J for Ginsburg, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter JJ), cited in United Kingdom, 
‘Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Respondents’, Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, No 08-1191, 25 Febru-
ary 2010, 21 n 47. 
115 United Kingdom, ‘Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents’, Submission in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 
No 08-1191, 25 February 2010, 22–3. 
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A  The Anti-Fraud Provisions 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison centred on alleged breaches of 
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5. Due to their prominence within US 
securities litigation (both in the class action context and as an SEC tool of 
enforcement) and the emphasis on the text adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Morrison, the anti-fraud provisions are reproduced in part below. 
The relevant part of § 10 provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange … 
 (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered … any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Ex-
change] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors.116 
Rule 10b-5, promulgated under § 10(b), makes it unlawful 
for any person … by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or … any facility of any national securities exchange, 
 (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact … or 
 (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit …  
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.117 
Two preliminary observations may be made here. First, it can be gleaned from 
the language that the provisions operate as a catch-all118 in the sense of regulat-
ing and proscribing a broad range of corporate behaviours. Secondly, while 
neither of the provisions expressly provide for a private right of action, it has 
long been established by US courts that such a right does exist.119 Described as 
‘a necessary supplement to [SEC] action’,120 the private right is seen by US 
federal courts as crucial to preserving the integrity of and promoting confidence 
in US markets.121 Indeed, the term ‘private Attorney-General’ has been coined by 
 
116 15 USC § 78j (2006). 
117 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2009). 
118 Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 202–3 (Powell J for Burger CJ, Powell, Stewart, 
White, Marshall and Rehnquist JJ) (1976). See also Eric C Chaffee, ‘Standing under Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Pur-
chaser–Seller Requirement’ (2009) 11 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 843, 
843–4 and the references cited therein. 
119 Superintendent of Insurance of New York v Bankers Life & Casualty Co, 404 US 6, 13 
(Douglas J for the Court) (1971); Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 196 (Powell J for 
Burger CJ, Powell, Stewart, White, Marshall and Rehnquist JJ) (1976). 
120 Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards Inc v Berner, 472 US 299, 310 (Brennan J for Burger CJ and 
Brennan J) (1985), citing J I Case Co v Borak, 377 US 426, 432 (Clark J) (1964). 
121 See, eg, Rochelle v Marine Midland Grace Trust Co of New York, 535 F 2d 523, 532–3 
(Hufstedler J for Hufstedler, Wright and Goodwin JJ) (9th Cir, 1976). 
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observers to reflect the symbiotic relationship between the (sometimes intersect-
ing) aspirations of public and private actors in US securities litigation.122 
B  The Extraterritorial Operation of the Anti-Fraud Provisions 
In a similar vein to the implied private right of action, an examination of the 
text of rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) reveals that neither provision expressly refers to 
any extraterritorial application. Indeed, there has long been curial recognition 
that where legislative text does not speak of extraterritorial application, a 
presumption against extraterritoriality arises.123 Although lower US federal 
courts have recognised this ‘congressional silence’,124 those same courts had 
overcome this presumption in the anti-fraud context by formulating the ‘conduct’ 
and ‘effects’ tests. 
Broadly speaking, application of those tests involved balancing the domestic 
and foreign elements of a claim to determine the extraterritoriality of the anti-
fraud provisions in each case.125 As will be demonstrated below, Morrison 
represents a radical departure from the earlier norm characterised by the conduct 
and effects tests — a norm that had survived for 42 years until the Supreme 
Court handed down its decision in June 2010. The Morrison ruling is best 
understood in the light of what preceded it. Accordingly, the tests, and the 
difficulty US federal courts had in applying them, will be examined in the 
following sections. 
C  The Effects Test 
In Schoenbaum v Firstbrook (‘Schoenbaum’),126 a US plaintiff and shareholder 
of Banff Oil Ltd (‘Banff’), a Canadian corporation, brought a derivative suit 
against Banff and its officers. The plaintiff alleged that Banff, together with its 
controlling shareholders, had arranged for the acquisition of Banff shares at far 
below market value in contravention of § 10(b).127 That transaction took place 
entirely in Canada. The plaintiff argued that although the transaction occurred 
outside US territorial borders, it had the effect of artificially diluting the share-
pool and diminishing the value of Banff securities trading in the US market.128 
 
122 Peta Spender, ‘Securities Class Actions: A View from the Land of the Great White Shareholder’ 
(2002) 31 Common Law World Review 123, 124. See also Amanda M Rose, ‘Reforming Securi-
ties Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement 
of Rule 10b-5’ (2008) 108 Columbia Law Review 1301 (in relation to securities class actions); 
Spender, ‘The Class Action as Sheriff’, above n 89 (in relation to class actions generally). 
123 Foley Bros Inc v Filardo, 336 US 281, 285 (Reed J for Vinson, Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, 
Rutledge and Burton JJ) (1949); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co, 499 US 244, 248 (Rehnquist CJ for Rehnquist CJ, White, O’Connor, Kennedy and 
Souter JJ) (1991). 
124 See, eg, the discussion in Bersch v Drexel Firestone Inc, 519 F 2d 974, 993 (Friendly J for 
Friendly, Mulligan and Timbers JJ) (2nd Cir, 1975). 
125 Margaret V Sachs, ‘The International Reach of Rule 10b-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence’ 
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Despite the conduct occurring outside the US, the Second Circuit asserted 
jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Court held that acts outside the territorial limits of 
the US that produce detrimental effects within those limits justify extending 
jurisdiction of the anti-fraud provisions.129 Because the sale of undervalued stock 
in Canada adversely affected Banff securities registered on a US exchange, the 
Court held that the assertion of jurisdiction was justified.130 
The general — and perhaps prototypical — expression of the effects test was 
enunciated in Securities and Exchange Commission v Berger (‘Berger’).131 The 
Berger Court stated the test as: ‘whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial 
effect in the United States or upon United States citizens.’132 On some occasions, 
application of the test is relatively straightforward. For example, overseas 
transactions causing a direct loss for a US citizen and holder of US registered 
securities would likely satisfy the jurisdictional question under the effects test. 
Yet the requirement that acts detrimentally affect US investors leaves some 
unanswered questions regarding the test’s specific boundaries and limitations. A 
fundamental problem with the test is ‘developing a neutral limiting principle that 
clearly delineates … how strong those effects must be.’133  
D  The Conduct and Admixture Tests 
If the effects test looks to the effect of foreign conduct, the conduct test is its 
converse. Unlike the effects test, there is no requirement that securities listed on 
a US exchange be adversely affected, and the inquiry looks instead to conduct 
within US territorial borders. 
The first application of the conduct test occurred in Leasco Data Processing 
Equipment Corporation v Maxwell (‘Leasco’)134 which involved fraudulent 
misrepresentations made in the US that induced Leasco, a US plaintiff, to 
purchase securities listed in London.135 As the securities were not registered on a 
US exchange, the effects test had no application. However, the Leasco Court 
held that the parties’ conduct within the US (which included the execution of the 
relevant agreement) together with Leasco’s nationality was sufficient to attract 
jurisdiction.136 
Much like the difficulty in determining the precise scope of the effects test 
outlined above, Leasco left unanswered the question as to the precise degree of 
conduct that triggers jurisdiction. In Bersch v Drexel Firestone Inc (‘Bersch’)137 
the Second Circuit attempted to resolve this issue by prescribing three tests. 
Under the first, where overseas fraud causes injury to an American citizen 
 
129 Ibid 206. 
130 Ibid 208–9. 
131 322 F 3d 187 (2nd Cir, 2003). 
132 Ibid 192 (Cabranes J for Van Graafeiland, Jacobs and Cabranes JJ). 
133 Gregory K Matson, ‘Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts over Transnational 
Securities Fraud’ (1990) 79 Georgetown Law Journal 141, 149. 
134 468 F 2d 1326 (2nd Cir, 1972). 
135 Ibid 1330 (Friendly CJ for Friendly CJ, Feinberg and Davis JJ). 
136 Ibid 1334–8. 
137 519 F 2d 974 (2nd Cir, 1975). 
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resident in the US, no conduct within the US need be shown.138 This test can be 
seen as a natural extension of the effects test. If, on the other hand, a US citizen 
residing abroad suffers loss, then in order to trigger jurisdiction they must show 
domestic conduct of material importance that significantly contributed to the 
injury.139 The final test — a test that would likely fit the facts in Morrison — 
requires a foreign plaintiff to show that the domestic conduct directly caused the 
loss.140 A natural question would then be what type of conduct is materially 
important or directly causative of loss? The Court in Bersch attempted to answer 
this question, concluding that ‘merely preparatory activities’ will not satisfy the 
conduct test where the injury occurs to a foreign plaintiff, but are sufficient when 
the ‘injury is to Americans so resident.’141 
Muddying the waters further was the introduction of the ‘admixture’ test which 
followed the Second Circuit’s decision in Itoba Ltd v Lep Group plc. In that case, 
the Court noted that ‘an admixture or combination of the [conduct and effects 
tests] often gives a better picture of whether there is sufficient United States 
involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction’.142 
E  Circuit Splits and Criticisms 
Despite the Second Circuit’s attempt to engineer a legal rule, application of the 
conduct test — and by extension the admixture test — has been problematic. 
Commentators have seized on the tests’ haphazard evolution and application. 
Langevoort lamented that the decisions giving rise to the conduct test were 
influenced, not by a principled approach to important questions of transnational 
enforcement, but rather by ‘simplistic, ad hoc judgments of whether the conduct 
was “substantial enough.”’143 
Another somewhat more fundamental criticism concerns the Circuit Courts’ 
approach to the issue of congressional silence. The Circuits crafted the conduct 
and effects tests by adopting a methodology that rests on three propositions.144 
First, there was an active acknowledgment that textually, the anti-fraud provi-
sions are silent on the issue of extraterritorial application.145 Normally, the 
absence of clear and specific textual indicia would end the inquiry into extraterri-
torial scope. Such an approach would accord with the earlier Supreme Court 
decision in Foley Bros Inc v Filardo (‘Foley Bros’) where it was noted that 
Congress is mainly concerned with domestic conditions.146 
 
138 Ibid 993 (Friendly J for Friendly, Mulligan and Timbers JJ). 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid 992. 
142 54 F 3d 118, 122 (Van Graafeiland J for Feinberg, Van Graafeiland and Miner JJ) (2nd Cir, 1995). 
143 Langevoort, ‘Schoenbaum Revisited’, above n 14, 247. 
144 This analysis is adapted from Sachs, above n 125, 685–8. 
145 Zoelsch v Arthur Andersen & Co, 824 F 2d 27, 29–30 (Bork J for Bork and Silberman JJ) 
(DC Cir, 1987). 
146 336 US 281, 285 (Reed J for Vinson, Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge and Burton JJ) 
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However — and despite the absence of clear legislative intent — the Circuits 
felt it was appropriate to read extraterritorial content into the anti-fraud provi-
sions. Underpinning this was a perception that Congress would have intended the 
Exchange Act to have some extraterritorial application and that the silence of 
Congress was unintentional.147 Comments by Friendly J in Bersch encapsulated 
and sought to justify this approach. His Honour noted that the anti-fraud provi-
sions were passed in the wake of the Great Depression and that at the time, 
Congress ‘could hardly have been expected to foresee the development of off-
shore funds thirty years later.’148  
The second proposition rests on the surrounding text and preamble of the 
Exchange Act that are said to ‘implicitly sanction a wide international reach … 
[that is] derived from ambiguous statutory text’.149 Finally, for the Bersch Court, 
the underlying purpose of triggering jurisdiction notwithstanding congressional 
silence was a concern that the US not be used as a base for fraudulent 
schemes.150 More colourfully, as discussed above, the Kasser Court took an 
expansive view of the conduct test for fear of the US becoming a Barbary Coast 
for transnational fraudsters.151 These comments reflect a body of case law that is 
laden with judicial policymaking, leading the Supreme Court in 1975 to describe 
this case law as ‘a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legisla-
tive acorn.’152  
VI  MO R R I S O N  — TH E  SU P R E M E  CO U RT DE C I S I O N 
As stated above, the Morrison plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed by both the 
District Court and the Second Circuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.153 
The appellants sought a review of the Second Circuit’s decision in the US 
Supreme Court. The central question presented to the Supreme Court was 
whether the Second Circuit erred in granting the motion to dismiss the claim for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court decision was eagerly awaited. First, as an f-cubed case, it 
contrasted with all the foundation cases that had had at least one domestic 
element anchoring them to the jurisdiction of US courts. For instance, 
Schoenbaum — which established the effects test — involved a domestic 
plaintiff trading in domestic securities, while Leasco — which established the 
conduct test — involved a domestic plaintiff and impugned conduct occurring 
 
147 See, eg, Schoenbaum, 405 F 2d 200, 206 (Lumbard CJ for Lumbard CJ and Medina J) (2nd Cir, 
1968). 
148 Bersch, 519 F 2d 974, 993 (Friendly J for Friendly, Mulligan and Timbers JJ) (2nd Cir, 1975). See 
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149 Sachs, above n 125, 688, citing, inter alia, Leasco, 486 F 2d 1326 (2nd Cir, 1972). Note that Sachs 
is sharply critical of this approach, especially in light of the legislative history of the Exchange 
Act: Sachs, above n 125, 689–713. 
150 Bersch, 519 F 2d 974, 987 (Friendly J for Friendly, Mulligan and Timbers JJ) (2nd Cir, 1975). 
151 Kasser, 548 F 2d 109, 116 (Adams J for Adams, Weis and Fogel JJ) (3rd Cir, 1977). 
152 Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723, 737 (Rehnquist J for Burger CJ, Rehnquist 
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within the territorial borders of the US. The Second Circuit expressly recognised 
that Morrison was the first ‘foreign-cubed’ action to reach a Federal Court of 
Appeal.154 By applying the jurisdictional tests to an f-cubed claim, the Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to probe the jurisdictional limits of the anti-fraud 
provisions. 
Secondly, Morrison provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to re-
solve a split that had developed amongst the Circuit Courts in relation to the 
interpretation of the conduct test.155 Thirdly, this was an opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to provide further guidance on the operation of comity in dealing 
with the extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
A  The Outcome in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, but ultimately dismissed the 
appeal in an 8:0 decision.156 Scalia J (joined by Roberts CJ, Kennedy, Thomas 
and Alito JJ) delivered the judgment of the Court (‘the majority judgment’), with 
Breyer J delivering a judgment agreeing with the order and relevantly concurring 
with the majority’s reasoning. Stevens and Ginsburg JJ (‘the minority judgment’) 
also dismissed the appeal; however, their Honours’ reasoning differed signifi-
cantly to that of the majority and a brief discussion of that judgment will be 
presented below. 
B  The Majority Judgment 
1 A Question of Merit 
Before delivering their substantive judgment, the majority addressed what their 
Honours deemed to be a threshold error in the Second Circuit’s and District 
Court’s reasoning in finding that the claim should be dismissed due to the lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.157 For the majority, subject matter jurisdiction — 
which refers to a court’s power to hear a case158 — was not the locus of inquiry. 
Instead, the question was one of merits, namely discerning what type of conduct 
§ 10(b) regulates and proscribes (in contradistinction to questioning a forum’s 
capacity to resolve a justiciable controversy).159 Their Honours concluded that 
the District Court did, in fact, have the power to adjudicate but declined the 
appellants’ invitation to send the matter back for rehearing to the lower Court, as 
it would only ‘require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label [failure to state a claim] for the 
 
154 Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 547 F 3d 167, 172 (Parker J for Newman, Calabresi and 
Parker JJ) (2nd Cir, 2008). 
155 The case was described by the plaintiffs as ‘an ideal opportunity to resolve the reach of the 
Exchange Act provisions to transnational securities fraud under the “conduct test”’: Robert 
Morrison et al, ‘Petition for a Writ of Certiorari’, Submission in Morrison v National Australia 
Bank Ltd, No 08-1191, 23 March 2009, 15. 
156 Morrison, 130 S Ct 2869 (2010). 
157 Ibid 2876–7 (Scalia J for Roberts CJ, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito JJ). 
158 Union Pacific Railroad Co v Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General 
Committee of Adjustment, Central Region, 130 S Ct 584, 596 (Ginsburg J for the Court) (2009). 
159 Morrison, 130 S Ct 2869, 2877 (Scalia J for Roberts CJ, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito JJ) 
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same Rule 12(b)(1) conclusion.’160 A merits examination would not ask whether 
the federal courts are possessed of subject matter jurisdiction, but rather would 
investigate the type of conduct that § 10(b) seeks to regulate. 
After addressing this point, the majority proceeded to discern what type of 
conduct is prohibited by the anti-fraud provisions, and in this context they turned 
first to the conduct and effects tests outlined above. 
2 The Conduct and Effects Tests and the Presumption against 
Extraterritoriality 
The majority began with two preliminary but important observations. First, 
they explored the presumption against extraterritoriality, seeing it as a canon of 
statutory construction. Their Honours cited with approval the Supreme Court’s 
statements in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Arabian American 
Oil Co (‘Aramco’) and Foley Bros ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a 
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States.’161 For the Morrison majority, because the legislature is 
ordinarily concerned with the regulation of domestic matters, only clear legisla-
tive intent can rebut the presumption.162 Secondly, the majority conveyed a 
stinging criticism of the Circuit Courts’ approach to congressional silence, 
observing that the lower courts had mistakenly regarded silence as an invitation 
to judicially engineer legislative intent.163 Their Honours opined that this 
‘disregard of the presumption against extraterritoriality … produced a collection 
of tests for divining what Congress would have wanted, complex in formulation 
and unpredictable in application.’164 Their Honours observed that the ‘Second 
Circuit never put forward a textual or even extratextual basis for these tests.’165 
In support of this, the majority seized on the Second Circuit’s comment in 
Bersch that ‘if … asked to point to language in the statutes … that compelled 
these conclusions, we would be unable to respond.’166  
The majority judgment then moved on to highlight the difficulty in applying 
the conduct test by pointing out several of its defining characteristics: the 
gradations of conduct required by Bersch depends on the nationality of a harmed 
investor;167 the test is fact rather than rule driven (as acknowledged by the 
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161 Ibid (emphasis added), quoting Aramco, 499 US 244, 248 (Rehnquist CJ for Rehnquist CJ, 
White, O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter JJ) (1991), which in turn quoted Foley Bros, 336 US 281, 
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Second Circuit);168 and the test was of uncertain scope, which had led to 
disparate determinations of the test’s limits and Circuit discordance.169 Finally, 
the majority cited a swathe of academic criticism regarding the conduct test, its 
evolution and its inconsistent application.170 Their Honours concluded that those 
criticisms were justified and surmised that 
[t]he results of judicial-speculation-made-law — divining what Congress would 
have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court — demonstrate 
the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather than guess 
anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable 
background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.171 
3 Was the Presumption against Extraterritoriality Displaced? 
After dispatching the erroneous approach to subject matter jurisdiction and 
inviting a merits investigation — that is, an investigation of the type of conduct 
that § 10(b) seeks to regulate — as well as reasserting the importance of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and the role of legislative intent in the 
operation of extraterritoriality, the majority proceeded to decide whether the 
presumption had been displaced in this case. Their Honours reached the prelimi-
nary conclusion that prima facie, nothing indicated that § 10(b) applied extrater-
ritorially.172 Notwithstanding this, the appellants together with the US Solicitor-
General advanced three propositions that were said to demonstrate an extraterri-
torial intent.173  
The first of these related to the definition of particular terms found in § 10(b). 
Specifically, it was asserted that the extraterritorial operation of § 10(b) could be 
imputed from the definition of ‘interstate commerce’ which includes ‘com-
merce … between any foreign country and any State’.174 The majority rejected 
that submission, referring to Aramco where it was stated that the Supreme Court 
has ‘repeatedly held that even statutes that contain broad … definitions of 
“commerce” that expressly refer to “foreign commerce” do not apply abroad.’175 
However, unlike Aramco, the majority’s conclusion on this point was not 
preceded by a measured and reasoned analysis. In this respect the judgment was 
left wanting, as the argument centred on a core definitional term and therefore 
warranted further exploration. Instead, their Honours cursorily stated that the 
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‘general reference to foreign commerce … does not defeat the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.’176 
The second proposition advanced by the appellants involved a congressional 
observation regarding the purposes of the Exchange Act. Congress had noted that 
the ‘prices established and offered [in transactions commonly conducted on US 
exchanges and OTC markets] are generally disseminated … throughout the 
United States and foreign countries’,177 and it was said that this observation was 
supportive of an extraterritorial effect for § 10(b).178 In a similar vein to their 
treatment of the appellants’ first argument, the majority quickly dispensed with 
this second proposition, stating that a ‘fleeting reference to the dissemination and 
quotation abroad … of securities traded in domestic exchanges … cannot 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.’179 However, unlike the 
earlier argument which centred on a core definition, the congressional observa-
tions here were, at best, tangential to the central question of the extraterritoriality 
of § 10(b). The reason for this is that the comments were seemingly made only in 
reference to the daily operation of securities markets, rather than the operative 
effect of a central term such as § 10(b). In this respect, their Honours had at least 
some, if not ample, justification for quickly dispensing with the appellants’ 
argument. 
The final argument raised in support of extraterritoriality related to  
§§ 30(a)–(b) of the Exchange Act.180 Broadly speaking, neither provision has a 
direct connection with § 10(b). Instead, § 30(b) provides for operative exemp-
tions from the Exchange Act for rule(s) promulgated under the Act where a 
person ‘transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United 
States’.181 That exception does not apply where the party transacts in violation of 
SEC rules designed to prevent evasion of the Exchange Act.182 A reading of the 
provision therefore provides an indirect statement of extraterritorial effect in 
respect of § 30(b), but § 30(b) only. Conversely, § 30(a) provides for a direct 
statement of extraterritoriality: it prohibits the use of ‘any means … of interstate 
commerce for the purpose of effecting on an exchange not … subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, any transaction … in contravention of [SEC 
Rules]’.183 The argument proffered was that the extraterritorial effect of 
§§ 30(a)–(b) (through either direct or indirect intention) could be extrapolated to 
give the entire Exchange Act some extraterritorial effect — which would then 
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flow to § 10(b).184 For the Court however, the statements evincing extraterritorial 
application in §§ 30(a)–(b) militated against, rather than supported, a conclusion 
that the entire Act has extraterritorial application. Central to their Honours’ 
reasoning was that those statements providing for extraterritorial effect ‘would 
be quite superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to transac-
tions on foreign exchanges’.185 
Ultimately, rejection of all three arguments raised by the Solicitor-General and 
appellants led the majority to conclude that § 10(b) does not apply extraterritori-
ally since the Exchange Act contains no ‘affirmative indication’ that it does.186 
The majority bookended this aspect of their judgment by addressing a particular 
concern found in the minority judgment of Stevens and Ginsburg JJ. The 
minority stated that the majority had impermissibly ‘transform[ed] the presump-
tion from a flexible rule of thumb into something more like a clear statement 
rule.’187 The majority responded to this by stating that ‘[a]ssuredly context can 
be consulted as well.’188 
4 What the Laws Prohibit: The Transactional Test  
After dealing with the anterior issues outlined above, the majority went on to 
explore the limits of conduct regulated and proscribed by § 10(b). They formu-
lated their analysis around a proposition advanced by the appellants that the 
location of the deceptive conduct — namely the domestic asset valuation that 
occurred in Florida — provided a sufficient territorial nexus irrespective of 
whether or not § 10(b) had extraterritorial application.189 Their Honours recog-
nised that the issue required further analysis, conceding that very few if any such 
actions lack all contact with the US.190 However, the majority noted that ‘the 
presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog … 
if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved’.191 It 
was against this backdrop that their Honours delivered this facet of the judgment. 
Their Honours began by looking carefully at the text, particularly noting that 
the wording of § 10(b) proscribes deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or 
any security not so registered’.192 The phrases ‘in connection with the purchase 
or sale’ and ‘of any security registered on a national exchange or any security not 
so registered’ led the majority to conclude that the Exchange Act does not focus 
on where deception originates, and nor does § 10(b) focus on a prohibition of 
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general deceptive conduct within the US. Instead, it is those purchase and sale 
transactions within the US that ‘are the objects of the statute’s solicitude.’193  
Properly construed, the new test (‘the transactional test’) under the anti-fraud 
provisions is satisfied only where:  
1 the purchase or sale of a security is made in the US; or 
2 the purchase or sale is of a security listed on a US domestic exchange.194 
In the instant case, because the Australian litigants neither transacted in the US 
nor exercised a transaction in respect of a US registered security, § 10(b) was 
said to have no application, and the appellant’s claim was dismissed.195 
The US Solicitor-General suggested a different test (effectively a modified 
conduct test) that would be satisfied where ‘the fraud involves significant 
conduct in the United States that is material to the fraud’s success.’196 The basis 
for this test was said to be the need to prevent the US ‘from becoming a “Bar-
bary Coast” for malefactors perpetrating frauds in foreign markets.’197 
In the process of rejecting this test, the majority stated that there is no reason to 
believe that the US has become a Barbary Coast, although ‘some fear that it has 
become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers’.198 
5 Discussion of Comity 
The majority gave scant regard to the issue of comity. Instead, they again 
followed Aramco and opined that the probability of incompatibility with the 
securities laws of other countries is so obvious that Congress would have 
addressed the issue if it had intended extraterritoriality.199  
The majority did acknowledge that disparate legal systems produce different 
modes of securities regulation. This was driven in part by the issues raised in the 
amicus briefs discussed above in Part IV(E).200 However, the discussion went no 
further than enumerating some of those differences and pointing out that many 
governments had filed amicus briefs complaining of ‘the interference with 
foreign securities regulation that application of § 10(b) abroad would pro-
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duce’.201 The majority did not expand on this point, as it considered that its 
declaration of the bright-line transactional test was sufficient to provide certainty 
to nation states.202 
In this respect, the decision confirmed the comment made by the Harvard Law 
Review in 1985 that comity was treated by the US courts merely as a nod to 
foreign interests and that the analysis was often perfunctory.203 
C  The Minority Judgment 
After examining the issue of congressional silence, the minority decision 
analysed the presumption against extraterritoriality that featured so prominently 
in the majority judgment. The minority looked at the presumption generally 
before applying it to the instant case. 
First, and unlike the majority who repeatedly and approvingly cited Aramco as 
a basis to adopt a strict presumption against extraterritoriality that could only be 
displaced by clear legislative language,204 the minority saw passages within the 
same decision as justifying a broader inquiry that looks not merely to the text, 
but also to extra-textual evidence.205 In particular, their Honours took aim at the 
majority’s strict position that in the absence of clear textual indicia, a statute has 
no extraterritorial application.206 For the minority, this ‘clear statement rule’ 
represents an overstatement of the principle.207 Instead, the presumption should 
be applied as ‘a tool for managing international conflict, a background norm, a 
tiebreaker.’208 
In this context, their Honours looked to how the presumption applied to 
§ 10(b) specifically, and concluded that even a clear statement rule would only 
have marginal relevance in this case.209 In support of this conclusion, the 
minority considered that the presumption would operate only to the extent that it 
precludes claims ‘with no effects in the United States [that are] hatched and 
executed entirely outside this country.’210 
Instead, their Honours saw the real question in Morrison as an investigation 
into how much and what type of ‘domestic contacts … trigger application of 
§ 10(b).’211 In answering this, their Honours saw the formulation of the conduct 
test in Berger — that § 10(b) applies to transnational frauds ‘only when substan-
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tial acts in furtherance of the fraud were committed within the United 
States’212 — as the appropriate line to draw.213 The minority then selectively 
cited excerpts from a variety of cases214 to support their assertion that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies with even less force where adverse 
effects or conduct within US borders is established.215 
The minority cited references in the Exchange Act that did refer to extraterrito-
riality.216 However, unlike the majority who engaged in a technical and thorough 
investigation of the same provisions, the minority merely pointed out that these 
aspects of the Exchange Act give ‘strong clues’ that § 10(b) has at least some 
extraterritorial application.217 Ultimately, their Honours felt that the majority by 
‘beginning and ending’ with the statutory text engaged in an impermissibly 
narrow inquiry.218 
Finally, for the minority, it is not transactions on domestic exchanges that are 
the ‘objects of [§ 10(b)’s] solicitude’.219 Instead, it is the protection of US 
investors from fraud that the Exchange Act seeks to achieve.220 Their Honours 
presented the following hypothetical to support their conclusion about § 10(b)’s 
policy objectives and the drawbacks of the majority’s bright-line ruling: 
Imagine … a company listed only on an overseas exchange. That company has 
a major American subsidiary with executives based in New York City; and it 
was in New York … that the executives masterminded … a massive decep-
tion … which will, upon its disclosure, cause the [share] price to plummet. … 
[T]hose same executives go knocking on doors in Manhattan and convince an 
unsophisticated retiree, on the basis of material misrepresentations, to invest her 
life savings in the company’s doomed securities.221 
For the minority, the majority’s narrowing of § 10(b)’s reach under the new 
test unnecessarily risked ‘walling off’ such investors by excising their standing 
under § 10(b), resulting in an ‘oddity … that … should give pause.’222 This 
policy judgement contrasts markedly with the majority’s concern that the US 
should not become a ‘Shangri-La’ for plaintiff attorneys.223  
Ultimately, however, their Honours were neither satisfied that the ‘heart’ of the 
fraud occurred in the US, nor satisfied that there were adverse impacts on US 
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investors or markets sufficient to attract jurisdiction.224 Instead, the instant case 
had ‘Australia written all over it’225 and the minority dismissed the appeal. 
VII   CO N G R E S S  RE S P O N D S  — TH E  DO D D–FR A N K  AC T  
The Dodd–Frank Act was signed into law on 21 July 2010, less than a month 
after the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Morrison. As a whole, the Act 
is an ambitious regulatory document said to represent ‘one of the most wide-
ranging legislative efforts at financial reform since the Great Depression.’226 The 
Act canvasses many topics which are beyond the scope of this case note — from 
the regulation of credit rating agencies227 and OTC swaps, to a prohibition on 
particular types of short selling.228 
However, two provisions in the Act feature prominently when seen against the 
backdrop of Morrison. The first of these is § 929P(b)(2), the relevant parts of 
which provide that (emphasis added): 
 (b) … The district courts of the United States … shall have jurisdiction of 
an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the [Securities and Ex-
change] Commission … alleging a violation of the antifraud provi-
sions … involving —  
 (1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps 
in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction 
occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign inves-
tors; or 
 (2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foresee-
able substantial effect within the United States. 
Section 929P(b)(2) may be seen as a codification of the conduct and effects 
tests that characterised the earlier jurisprudence on the US anti-fraud provisions, 
as discussed above in Part V. It may therefore be seen as an attempt to claw back 
some of the extraterritorial ground lost by Morrison. However, § 929P(b)(2) only 
applies to actions initiated by the SEC. As stated by Coffee, ‘Congress’ goal was 
to ensure that the outcome in Morrison did not strip the SEC of its traditional 
authority.’229 
In terms of private rights of action, § 929Y of the Act requires the SEC to 
solicit public comment and determine the extent to which private rights of action 
should be extended to cover the conduct and effects tests.230 Thereafter, the SEC 
is to report and recommend to Congress whether or not a provision mirroring 
 
224 Ibid 2895 (Stevens J for Stevens and Ginsburg JJ). 
225 Ibid. 
226 David S Frankel, Alan R Friedman and Melissa J Prober, ‘Dodd–Frank’s Impact on Securities 
Enforcement and Litigation’ (2010) 18(10) Metropolitan Corporate Counsel 12, 12. 
227 Dodd–Frank Act § 933. 
228 See, eg, ibid § 929X. 
229 John C Coffee Jr, ‘What Hath Morrison Wrought?’, New York Law Journal (New York), 
16 September 2010, 5. 
230 See SEC, Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action: Request for Comments (25 October 
2010) <http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/34-63174.pdf >. 
     
2011] Morrison and Enforcement in a Globalised Securities Market 311 
 
     
§ 929P(b)(2) of the Dodd–Frank Act should be adopted for private rights of 
action. At the time of writing, the SEC is yet to report to Congress.231 
VIII   TH E  IM P L I C AT I O N S  O F  MO R R I S O N  
A  Within the United States 
The Morrison decision was important in bringing the US extraterritoriality 
debate back to basics by re-examining the textual basis of extraterritoriality and 
reasserting the presumption against extraterritoriality that had been neglected 
with the evolution of the conduct and effects tests. 
At the time of writing, the early post-Morrison case law indicates that the 
restraint that Langevoort called for232 has been delivered. The transactional test 
is being applied diligently233 and cited frequently,234 and there are indications 
that the strict approach to extraterritoriality will extend to other statutes.235 It is 
reported that plaintiff lawyers began voluntarily withdrawing f-cubed actions 
shortly after Morrison was decided.236 
However, the diligent application of the transactional test may have undesir-
able results for US policymakers in situations where the ‘protective shield’237 of 
US securities law cannot be provided for one of its citizens. In particular, in the 
hypothetical advanced in the minority judgment in Morrison — broadly speak-
ing, where a US investor acquires foreign securities on an overseas exchange and 
seeks to bring a non-US citizen to account238 — the investor will be barred by 
 
231 According to the SEC website, the report to Congress is planned for January to July 2012: SEC, 
Implementing Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act — Upcoming 
Activity (29 July 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dfactivity-upcoming.shtml>. 
See generally Richard W Painter, ‘The Dodd–Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was 
It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?’ (2011) 1 Harvard Business Law Review 195. 
232 Langevoort, ‘Schoenbaum Revisited’, above n 14, 249–50. 
233 See, eg, Re Vivendi Universal SA Securities Litigation (SD NY, No 02 Civ 05571 (RJH) (HBP), 
17 February 2011) (‘Re Vivendi’). The dictum of Holwell J in Re Vivendi demonstrates the dili-
gent application of the bright-line methodology when applied to f-cubed actions. In this context, 
his Honour dismissed the argument that § 10(b) applied to the purchase or sale of overseas secu-
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the transactional test from seeking relief under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act if the 
purchase is not regarded as having occurred in the US.239 This has led some 
commentators to note that the transactional test extends the operation of Morri-
son to f-squared, not just f-cubed, cases240 and in some cases would bar actions 
by US investors who purchased the securities of US issuers on a foreign ex-
change. As noted by Coffee, such an action is not even an f-squared action.241 
The speculation about the application of Morrison to f-squared actions has 
been realised by Plumbers Union Local No 12 Pension Fund v Swiss Reinsur-
ance Co (‘Plumbers’),242 where a class action was brought by US fund managers 
based in Chicago (‘Plumbers’) who had placed an order with brokers also based 
in Chicago to purchase Swiss Reinsurance (‘Swiss Re’) shares on a foreign 
exchange (a subsidiary of a Swiss exchange based in London). The US District 
Court for the Southern District of New York stated that ‘“the adoption of a clear 
test that will avoid” “interference with foreign securities regulation” is of 
paramount concern.’243 The Court found that, as a general matter, a purchase 
order in the US for a security that is sold on a foreign exchange is insufficient to 
subject the purchase to the coverage of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.244 
Plumbers was a US resident, made the decision to invest in the US and suf-
fered harm in the US. Plumbers’ orders for the Swiss Re shares were placed from 
Chicago, and the traders who executed the purchase orders were located in 
Chicago. On the other hand, the defendant was a Swiss corporation, the relevant 
shares were listed on the SWX Swiss Exchange (‘SWX’), and the stock market 
transactions in Swiss Re common stock were executed, cleared and settled on the 
virt-x trading platform, which was a subsidiary of SWX based in London.245 The 
Plumbers Court cited the earlier decision of Stackhouse v Toyota Motor Co 
which held that  
because the actual transaction takes place on the foreign exchange, the pur-
chaser or seller has figuratively traveled to that foreign exchange — presuma-
bly via a foreign broker — to complete the transaction.246 
The Plumbers Court also referred to earlier authorities that rejected considera-
tion of where the purchase had occurred. For example, Re Société Générale 
Securities Litigation stated that 
[b]y asking the Court to look to the location of ‘the act of placing a buy order,’ 
and to … ‘the place at the wrong,’ [the] Plaintiffs are asking the Court to apply 
the conduct test specifically rejected in Morrison.247  
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The plaintiffs in Plumbers noted that they might have a claim under Swiss law, 
but they did not pursue that avenue.248 The plaintiffs might naturally be discour-
aged from pursuing a claim in Switzerland because that jurisdiction has no 
equivalent to a class action procedure.249 
Whether the strict application of the transactional test can be sustained may 
depend upon the extent to which the US courts and Congress can resist the 
traditional role played by the US as the securities policeman. In a time of 
declining resources, securities regulation may not be a high priority, particularly 
public enforcement conducted by SEC. However, this is arguably a bad time to 
curtail enforcement, since the corporate misbehaviour that created the GFC is 
only beginning to be redressed. Ideally, private enforcement would complement 
public enforcement,250 but the future role of private enforcement in this area 
remains to be decided in the light of the SEC report commissioned under § 929Y 
of the Dodd–Frank Act. 
In particular, it is one thing to portray the securities market as populated by 
sophisticated investors and issuers, but when the focus shifts to retail investors, 
the Morrison test becomes more problematic. The dual nature of investment is an 
aspect of securities regulation that has perplexed policymakers for a long time, 
although it is an entrenched feature of existing Australian securities regulation251 
and plays an important role in new policy being generated in the area.252 From 
the US perspective, Langevoort identifies the need to ensure that the risks of 
foreign investment created by the system of regulatory differences (which have 
now been emphasised by Morrison) are understood by investors.253 
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B  The Centrifugal Effect of Morrison 
It is very likely that Morrison will have a centrifugal effect on transnational 
securities litigation, and securities class actions may flow to jurisdictions that 
have adopted the opt out procedure. One consequence of this might be that more 
securities class actions will be commenced in Australia. Redwood notes that 
although ‘the US has significantly wound back on the availability of securities 
class actions … Australia [has] move[d] in the opposite direction toward an 
environment more conducive to the bringing of large shareholder class ac-
tions.’254 Although many aspects of the US system that the Morrison amicus 
briefs claimed are pro-plaintiff — such as contingency fees, civil juries, the lack 
of ‘loser pays’ rules and certain types of punitive damages255 — are not present 
in Australia, the principal structural element of the class action, the opt out 
procedure, is available in the Federal Court of Australia256 and the Supreme 
Court of Victoria.257 
Moreover, the Australian appetite for class actions is demonstrated by the 
recent enactment of pt 10 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW),258 which 
provides for an opt out procedure in the New South Wales Supreme Court 
modelled on the Federal Court and Victorian Supreme Court equivalents.259 The 
participation of New South Wales may give critical mass to the Australian class 
action regime and lead to further rule changes. For example, the reform of proof 
of individual reliance in securities class actions is an open question in Australia. 
The fraud on the market theory allows plaintiffs in securities class actions in the 
US to rely upon the efficiency of the market to establish the reliance element in 
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act (or more specifically, rule 10b-5), rather than 
establishing individual reliance. The theory therefore more readily facilitates 
class certification.260 Fraud on the market theory was argued in a recent Austra-
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lian case,261 although the matter settled before judgment was handed down. The 
theory has also been discussed in several other Australian cases.262 As further 
securities class actions are commenced,263 the issue will require resolution.264 
Of course, if the bright-line transactional test in Morrison is effective in the 
long term, then there may be dissemination of litigation across many jurisdic-
tions that have diversified enforcement approaches. However, Morrison has left 
a lot of questions unanswered, particularly questions about comity and the 
recognition of jurisdictional diversity that were raised in the briefs filed on 
behalf of foreign governments. Of course, this controversy will be revisited by 
the SEC’s solicitation of public comments under the Dodd–Frank Act. Conway 
(quoting Le Monde) observed that the prospect of the SEC’s eventual report to 
Congress ‘“scares a … number of foreign capitals,” which “fear seeing the 
United States become” a global “financial policeman” through class-action 
lawsuits.’265 Conway urged interested parties, in particular the amici in Morrison 
‘who so emphatically urged the Supreme Court to reject extraterritoriality[,] … 
to make their views known once again, this time to the SEC.’266 Several of the 
amici — including the Australian,267 French268 and UK269 governments — have 
in fact made submissions in response to the SEC’s invitation. Unsurprisingly, 
their position is uniform and consistent: they urge caution against returning to 
the pre-Morrison norm.270 
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IX  CO N C L U S I O N 
The Morrison decision swept away over 40 years of expansive interpretation 
of the extraterritorial operation of the anti-fraud provisions and reversed the 
burgeoning role of the US as the international securities policeman. The short-
term effects of the decision indicate that diligent application by US domestic 
courts of the majority’s transactional test will restrict the extraterritorial opera-
tion of the anti-fraud provisions. Whether this is sustained in the long term will 
depend on whether the US courts can withstand the tension caused by US 
citizens losing the protective shield of US law when engaging in certain foreign 
securities transactions. More will be revealed by the SEC report commissioned 
pursuant to the Dodd–Frank Act and intriguing questions about the optimal 
relationship between private and public enforcement will continue. 
In the meantime, Morrison will have a centrifugal effect on transnational 
litigation with the result that securities claims are more likely to be brought in 
non-US jurisdictions. However, due to political and cultural differences in 
enforcement practices and regulatory intensity, the migration of securities 
litigation is likely to be uneven. Australia’s adoption of the opt out class action 
procedure, and its continuing appetite for the same (demonstrated by the recent 
New South Wales proposals to adopt this procedure), may mean that it is likely 
to gain a substantial share of this litigation. 
In the meantime, questions persist about achieving an international or a har-
monised framework for the enforcement of securities law. Whilst the arguments 
made by proponents of regulatory competition are laudable, the componentry of 
any proposed international enforcement regime needs to be carefully considered. 
Constructing an enforcement strategy around geographical boundaries is 
ultimately conceptually unworkable in a market where national boundaries are 
meaningless. 
Although delivered at a high level of generality, the G-20’s 2010 communiqué 
captured the essence of the task ahead: 
given the high interdependence among our countries in the global economic and 
financial system, uncoordinated responses will lead to worse outcomes for  
everyone. Our cooperation is essential.271  
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